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PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN ELITE ETHICS JOURNALS: TO QUOTA OR NOT TO QUOTA?

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In this paper, I paper explore one concrete manifestation of the gender problem in philosophy: namely, the underrepresentation of women in elite ethics journals. After presenting existing data regarding the underrepresentation of women-authored papers in elite ethics journals, I give some reasons for favoring proportional representation. I conclude by discussing gender-based quotas as one potential avenue of ensuring proportional representation of women in elite ethics journals. I canvass the usual and obvious reasons that are given for immediately dismissing quotas and argue that these reasons do not hold. This suggests, at minimum, that gender-based quotas should not be outright dismissed as a potential (albeit partial) solution to the gender problem in philosophy and that quotas are deserving of more consideration.

This paper is an attempt to address the underrepresentation of women in elite ethics journals. I focus on this problem because it is a concrete manifestation of the gender problem in philosophy, a problem that, while well known, can be difficult to pin down. I begin by discussing the gender problem in philosophy. I outline the data regarding the underrepresentation of women-authored papers in elite ethics journals, where "ethics" is understood broadly to include not only normative ethics, metaethics, and applied ethics but also to include social and political philosophy. Next, I argue in favor of proportional representation. Finally, I discuss one potential avenue of ensuring proportional representation: namely, gender-based quotas in elite ethics journals. I do not provide a complete defense of this policy. I canvass the usual and obvious reasons that are given for immediately dismissing quotas. I argue that these reasons, when examined closely, do not hold. This suggests, at minimum, that gender-based quotas should

not be outright dismissed as a potential (albeit partial) solution to the gender problem in philosophy and that quotas are deserving of more consideration.

1. The Gender Problem in Philosophy

It is widely known that philosophy has a "woman problem." As Sally Haslanger writes,

> most professional philosophers are men; in fact, white men. It is a surprise to almost everyone that the percentage of women earning philosophy doctorates is less than in most of the physical sciences. . . . As recently as 2010, philosophy had a lower percentage of women doctorates than math, chemistry and economics.[1]

Molly Paxton, Carrie Figor, and Valerie Tiberius argue that in the United States, only 30 percent of PhDs in philosophy are granted to women.[2] The number of women in faculty positions in the United States is also dire. Paxton, Figor, and Tiberius show that "the proportion of females reliably decreases as one moves through each level in the academy, from introductory courses through the faculty population."[3] Only 25 percent of philosophy faculty are women.[4]

It is unclear what exactly causes the underrepresentation of women in philosophy. There are likely many causes. However, Paxton, Figdor, and Tiberius suggest that the lack of female role models and mentors is an important factor.[5] They argue that the mere lack of women faculty in classrooms may result in the low percentage of women entering philosophy early on. They also suggest, following Margaret Urban Walker, that having more women faculty who represent "the concerns, texts, and images that acknowledge women within undergraduate classrooms, graduate training, and professional media [may] allow women students to feel that a discipline, literally, comprehends them, that it is a space that they are free to enter and expected to enter."[6] Walker's explanation of the lack of women in philosophy is related to what I will call the *alienation problem*. The lack of women faculty sends a message to women students that they and their concerns are not welcome in the discipline. Because of the small number of women in faculty positions and the general invisibility of women in philosophy, many women students come to believe that there is no place for them in the discipline. This belief likely becomes solidified with more exposure to the discipline as it is further confirmed. This may explain why the number of women in philosophy decreases stepwise.

The lack of women faculty is likely just one of the many causes of the alienation problem and the broader gender problems within philosophy. Given the scale of the gender problem, it is surprising that there has been little discussion of what the other causes may be. In what follows, I suggest that the underrepresentation of women in elite ethics journals is likely another cause of the alienation problem and, in turn, a partial cause of the broader gender problem in philosophy.

2. Gender Ratios in Elite Ethics Journals

In her discussion "Gender Ratios of Papers Published in *Ethics* and the *Journal of Moral Philosophy*,"[7] Kathryn Norlock presents us with some preliminary data regarding the presence of women-authored papers in the journal *Ethics* and the *Journal of Moral Philosophy* (*JMP*), journals of very high standing in the area of ethics. The *Journal of Moral Philosophy* has an acceptance rate of 5 percent.[8] *Ethics* has an acceptance rate of approximately 4 percent.[9] Norlock reports that, in *JMP*, male-coded authors account for 82.5 percent of authors of all articles inspected; women-coded authors account for 17.5 percent. In *Ethics*, authors coded as male account for 80 percent of all authors of inspected articles; authors coded as female account for 20 percent. Similar things have been reported previously. Thom Brooks (the editor of *JMP* at the time) reports that the average number of women-authored papers in *JMP* from 2003–2009 was 22 percent.[10] Henry S. Richardson (the editor of *Ethics* both at the time and currently) suggests that the average number of women-authored papers in *Ethics* from 2007–2009 was 16 percent.[11] Similar findings appear in Eric Schwitzgebel and Carolyn Dicey Jennings's data. Their data is more recent and is taken from a broader sample of elite journals including *Philosophical Review*, *Mind*, *Journal of Philosophy*, *Noûs*, *Ethics*, and *Philosophy & Public Affairs* between the years 2013–2015.[12] They found that only 12 percent of authors publishing ethics articles in these journals were women.[13]

These are interesting facts, especially in relation to elite ethics journals. First, both *JMP* and especially *Ethics*, which uses triply anonymous reviewing procedures, have rigorous peer-review processes, which would seem to rule out any grounds for bias in reviewing. Second, conventional wisdom is that women are disproportionately likely to specialize in ethics, broadly construed. If this is correct, then in comparison to other areas of specialty, women should tend to publish in greater proportion in elite ethics journals. It is striking then that even in this area of philosophy, women are publishing significantly less than men.

In her "Preliminary Report of the Survey on Publishing in Philosophy," Sally Haslanger presents us with the information about the top five areas of specialization for women and men:[14]

Top five areas for women:	*Top five areas for men:*
1. Feminist Philosophy	1. Metaphysics
2. Applied Ethics	2. Epistemology
3. Normative Ethics	3. Philosophy of Mind
4. Social Philosophy/Social Theory	4. Normative Ethics
5. Political Philosophy	5. Metaethics

Four of the five top areas of specialization for women fall under the category of "ethics" broadly understood. In contrast, only two of the five top areas of

specialization for males, and they are the bottom two of the five, are in "ethics." Haslanger's work suggests that the conventional view regarding women's tendency to specialize in ethics, broadly understood, is correct.

In his discussion of citation rates of women in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Eric Schwitzgebel reports:

> I've just posted a list of the 267 contemporary authors (born 1900 or after) who are most cited in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. . . . 16/27 (59%) of the women had their primary influence in ethics, political philosophy, or history of philosophy, compared to 77/240 (32%) of the men ($Z = 2.7$, $p = .006$).[15]

Carolyn Dicey Jennings's work also confirms the conventional view that women tend to specialize in ethics.[16] Jennings assessed the makeup of the Board of Advisors for the Philosophical Gourmet, which has ten women, making up almost 18 percent of the board. She assessed the distribution of areas of specialization of board members and how it broke down by gender. Jennings finds that 30 percent percent of women board members specialized in ethical, legal, and political theory. This is in contrast to the 20 percent of men who specialize in these areas. Schwitzgebel and Jennings's most recent analysis of faculty in each subfield in 2014 concludes that women make up 34 percent of faculty working in ethics.[17]

In short, the data demonstrates that women do tend to specialize in ethics. All things being otherwise equal, we should expect from 28–34 percent of papers in journals that specialize in ethics to be authored by women. To the extent that this is not the case, it follows that women are not proportionately represented in the elite journals that Norlock discusses.

This raises the question of why women are underrepresented in these elite journals. There are at least two (likely related) reasons why women are underrepresented: (1) implicit gender bias, and (2) stereotype threat.[18]

Implicit biases are unconscious evaluative attitudes that we hold toward other people, groups, and things.[19] They can affect our understanding and behavior and are activated involuntarily and without our awareness or intentional control. Implicit *gender* biases are unconscious evaluative attitudes that we have about gender. For example, in spite of their conscious support of women, individuals with high levels of implicit gender bias are less likely to select a woman candidate for a job interview[20] or to provide her with a positive performance evaluation.[21] Implicit gender biases likely play a similar role in the underrepresentation of women in elite journals. Even with rigorous peer-review processes, there may be very little blind review anymore. Many of us present our in-progress work in talks and at conferences or post it on our personal webpages or blogs. As a result, the gender of the author may be known by the reviewers, even when the review process is supposed to be triply anonymous. This knowledge may trigger implicit biases that lead reviewers (both male and female) to unconsciously evaluate the work of women negatively, preventing publication of these papers.

Furthermore, implicit biases can be triggered even when anonymized processes are successful and the author's identity remains unknown. There are subtle triggers of implicit bias, small clues or markers that bespeak masculinity or femininity. For example, the use of "we" when referring to women or feminists in a submission can trigger implicit bias. The mere presence of women in examples, attention to gender, or reference to feminism can also trigger implicit biases and lead to negative evaluations of work that is submitted.

What grounds do we have for thinking that implicit bias may play some role? Consider the following submission and publication data regarding *JMP* and *Ethics*. Regarding *JMP*, Thom Brooks reports in 2009 that 20 percent of its submissions were by women and that 15 percent of its published papers were by women.[22] There is at least a 5 percent gap between the percentage of papers that are submitted by women and the percentage of papers by women that are published. Similarly, regarding *Ethics*, Henry S. Richardson reports that, from 2008–2009, 21 percent of its submissions were by women, and that from 2007–2008 and 2008–2009, 15 percent and 17 percent, respectively, of its published papers were by women.[23] From 2008–2009, there was a 4 percent difference between the percentage of papers that were submitted by women and the percentage of papers by women that were published. It is difficult to know what percentage of submissions to *Ethics* were by women from 2007–2008, but if the 2008–2009 numbers give us any indication, then there may have been as much as a 6 percent difference between the percentage of papers that were submitted by women and the percentage of papers by women that were published. In short, in both journals, there is a significant gap between the percentage of papers that are submitted by women and the percentage of papers by women that are published. Implicit bias may account for this difference.

The second probable reason that women are underrepresented in these elite journals is stereotype threat, which refers to being at risk of behaving in a way that confirms negative stereotypes about one's group.[24] For example, women tend to have lower scores on math tests when they are led to believe that the test will result in gender differences.[25] As Jennifer Saul writes, "victims of stereotype threat underperform on the relevant tasks because they are unconsciously preoccupied by fears of confirming the stereotypes about their group—so preoccupied that they show elevated heart rate and blood pressure."[26] When combined with the stereotype that women tend to be worse at math than men, believing that gender will have an impact on the test scores leads them to perform poorly.

Stereotype threat may explain why in elite journals there are fewer papers published by women than by men. Because of negative stereotypes about women's skills and abilities in philosophy, women may be less confident about the quality of their work. In turn, women may be much more likely to think that their work isn't good enough to be accepted in elite journals such as *Ethics* and *JMP* and may, in turn, fail to submit their papers to them altogether. In short, women may

underperform when it comes to publishing in elite journals because of stereotype threat and the resulting self-selection.

Preliminary data suggest that self-selection plays at least some role in the underrepresentation of women in elite ethics journals. Brooks reports that between 2003–2009, an average of 23 percent of the submissions to *JMP* were by women.[27] Similarly, Richardson reports that from 2008–2009, 21 percent of submissions were by women.[28] If, for example, women represent 30 percent of the faculty specializing in ethics, then women are underrepresented in submissions to elite ethics journals by 6–9 percent. Stereotype threat and the resulting self-selection may partially explain this underrepresentation.

3. Recommendation: Ensure That Women Are Proportionally Represented in These Elite Journals

It has been established, at least preliminarily, that women are not represented proportionately in *Ethics* and *JMP*. Fewer papers by women appear and are submitted to these journals than is proportionate to the number of women that specialize in ethics. The following subsections (i, ii, iii, and iv) offer good reasons to ensure proportional representation.

i. Proportional representation could be a partial solution to the alienation problem. The small number of papers published by women in the most prominent ethics journals is another potential cause of the alienation problem. As students become more familiar with their area of specialization and the qualities of journals in that area and what papers are published within them and by whom, it will become clear to them that there are few papers published by women in elite journals. Elite journals are yet another sphere where women are visibly excluded. This may lead women students to feel there is no place for them in the discipline, especially in the upper echelons. Ensuring there are proportionately more papers by women in journals such as *Ethics* and *JMP* could potentially be a way of reducing the alienation women within the field often feel and, in turn, may be a way of increasing the number of women who continue on in philosophy and eventually graduate with PhDs and seek faculty positions in philosophy.

ii. Proportional representation could also work to reduce stereotype threat. Women underperform in philosophy by failing to submit papers to elite journals because they are faced with the stereotype of women as being poor philosophers. Ensuring that more articles by women appear in elite journals—particularly in the areas in which women are most likely to specialize, such as ethics—could work to reduce negative stereotypes of women in philosophy. It would convey that women are doing high-quality work and are publishing in elite journals. Proportional representation could also work to correct for self-selection by conveying the message that a reasonable number of women do publish in elite ethics journals and that other women, too, could publish in such journals. If proportional representation

corrects for self-selection, then this would result in a greater number of submissions by women to elite ethics journals. Furthermore, Saul argues that stereotype threat likely plays a role in the underrepresentation of women in philosophy more broadly.[29] Because of the negative stereotypes of women in philosophy, women may tend to underperform in philosophy, preventing them from continuing on in the discipline. Ensuring proportionate representation of women authors in elite journals could work to alleviate the broader gender problems in philosophy by reducing stereotypes and related stereotype threat. This would, in turn, work to encourage more women to continue in philosophy.

iii. Proportional representation could be a means of repair for past implicit bias—implicit bias is a partial cause of the exclusion of women in journals of high standing. There are at least some preliminary reasons for holding that we are morally responsible for the bad effects of our implicit biases and, in turn, that we owe repair for the bad consequences that result from them. While we may not be responsible for the unconscious attitudes that we have, we may be responsible for the behavior that results from them. This is particularly so when we become aware of the fact that we have implicit biases, that they affect our behavior, and that there are ways of reducing their impact and still failing to take up any of these measures.[30] If we are responsible for our implicit biases and we do owe repair, then ensuring that papers by women have a proportionately greater presence in *Ethics* and *JMP* and other prominent ethics journals could be a way of making repair for their previous exclusion on the basis of implicit gender bias.

iv. Proportional representation could prevent future exclusion of women resulting from implicit bias. If it is not corrected for, then papers authored by women will continue to be excluded from elite journals. Instituting proportional representation could correct for implicit biases against women by serving as a check on reviewing processes and ensuring that a certain number of women are included in each journal issue.

4. Quotas?

If there are valid reasons for ensuring that proportionately more papers by women appear in journals of high standing, such as *Ethics* and *JMP*, how should we accomplish this? The gold standard of peer review, namely, triply anonymous peer review, may not be enough. It might be suggested that as a complement to robust triply anonymous peer review, we should institute a quota. Journals could be required to publish, per issue, a percentage of women-authored papers that is roughly proportional to the percentage of women who work in the field of ethics.

Quotas are controversial. They are controversial because they are an instance of affirmative action. Affirmative action is any positive step that is taken to increase the representation of minorities in areas from which they have been historically excluded, such as education or employment. Affirmative action is

highly controversial in the United States. Some have argued that affirmative action constitutes reverse discrimination.[31] Others have argued that it thwarts desert by separating effort and merit from outcomes by linking outcomes with race or gender.[32] Despite the controversy surrounding affirmative action, for the purposes of this paper, I will, for the most part, assume that affirmative action can be justified in at least some cases.[33] Given the scale of the gender problem in philosophy, I will also assume, for the reasons that I mentioned above, that affirmative action is justifiable in the case of women in philosophy because it can be a means of solving the alienation problem, repairing for implicit bias, reducing stereotype threat, and/or preventing further implicit bias and stereotype threat. The question that I am most interested in considering here is whether quotas are an appropriate means of accomplishing these goals.

In what follows, I will not launch a full defense of quotas. I will consider what I take to be the most obvious objections to quotas and show that they fail to be convincing.

#1—It is commonly argued that any form of affirmative action faces a high standard of justification. For example, it is held that before affirmative action can be implemented, it must be the case that no other option will work in its place. In this vein, one might wonder why quotas are needed at all if we can find other ways of encouraging women to submit work in greater numbers to elite ethics journals. The answer is that ensuring that more women submit articles to elite journals may not in itself be enough to ensure proportional representation. Even if women submit more work, implicit bias will still tend to lead to under-evaluation of women's work. Quotas would help to ensure that more of the papers submitted by women appear as published work in elite journals.

#2—One might argue that there is no need to institute a quota because anonymous peer review can be fixed through small changes that would make it more genuinely anonymous. For example, it has been suggested that authors (male and female) should be encouraged to change the title of their paper for review so that a paper title will not be linked with a particular author online. It is also argued that peer review would be improved if journals made it clearer to reviewers that they should refrain from reviewing a paper when the identity of the author is known.

If peer review could be genuinely anonymous, then it might work to ensure greater representation of women in elite ethics journals.[34] However, there are reasons to be skeptical about whether genuinely anonymous review is possible. It is already informally required that reviewers not Google the titles of the papers they are reviewing. This is thought to be part of good practice. Yet people still do it. Similarly, it is informally required that we abstain from reviewing work by people that we know. Yet people review papers by people they know. Author anonymity is not preserved in these cases. Furthermore, when it comes to work by individuals who are well established within a field—those who present their work widely and over long periods of time—most people in the field will come

to know their work. This seems especially true of those who develop a distinctive line that people associate with them, which typically happens once people are more established in the field.

It could be argued in response that maintaining author anonymity is only a problem for the few women who are well established or seniors within the profession. Most junior scholars are unlikely to be affected by this problem. They are less likely to have developed webpages, to present at conferences, or to have views associated with their names. In turn, it could be argued that this simply isn't a problem that is widespread enough to justify the institution of a quota in elite journals. This response ultimately fails to be compelling. First, maintaining author anonymity in the case of senior scholars is an important problem in itself. If the identity of established women scholars is known, one important effect that it can have is to keep women out of the top journals, which may have an effect on their citation rate and, in turn, on whether they are hired at places of high standing, both of which reinforce the glass ceiling. Second, the author's identity may not be unknown even in the case of junior scholars. Many junior scholars, including students, do have webpages that feature the titles and drafts of their works in progress. There are a number of prominent and widely attended annual conferences in ethics that feature presentations by junior scholars. Furthermore, junior scholars do often give departmental talks and send their work to other scholars in the field for feedback. While maintaining author anonymity may be more of a problem for senior or established scholars, it can be a significant problem for junior scholars as well.

One remedy may be to not circulate our work widely, through conferences and webpages, before submitting it for review. This, however, would not be in the spirit of philosophy, which places a high value on open discussion and the resulting refinement of ideas. Furthermore, because ruling out receipt of robust criticism before submission for review would result in a lower quality of work, it would be a significant loss for us as individual authors and for the discipline more broadly.

Finally, even if we could secure a more robust form of peer review for junior and senior scholars by preserving author anonymity, there may be reasons to be concerned about implicit bias slipping in, and that would work to exclude work by women of any level within the profession. From the studies on implicit bias and CVs, it is clear that seemingly innocuous things can work to trigger implicit bias—for example, listing what clubs you participate in, such as the PTA (which has been shown to trigger an implicit bias against mothers).[35] There is some reason to be worried that this sort of thing may happen in papers that are under review. For example, one might use examples that are gendered (that discuss birth or breastfeeding), which may work to indicate that the author is a woman. Even with rigorous peer review, this kind of example could trigger an implicit bias against women. In short, there is less reason for confidence about the robustness of peer

review than is often assumed. As a result, other options such as quotas may be a necessary complement to robust anonymous peer review.

#3—It might be argued that other methods, in addition to improving triply anonymous peer review, should be implemented in place of quotas, for example, encouraging submissions from a broad range of people, improving the topics covered by these journals in order to draw submissions from a greater variety of people, and ensuring inclusive editorial boards. It could be argued that these sorts of mechanisms should be implemented as a first step and that only if they fail should quotas be pursued. Three points can be made in response. First, these mechanisms could be combined with the implementation of quotas. We do not have to choose between them. Second, quotas would work well with these other mechanisms and toward the same ends. For example, quotas would likely encourage more women to submit articles to elite journals, since they would come to believe that they have a genuine chance of publishing within these journals. If more women submit and are published within elite journals, then there would likely be a broader range of topics covered in the journals, which, in turn, might motivate more submissions from women. Third, one advantage of implementing quotas in place of or in addition to these other mechanisms is that (a) quotas are immediately and concretely corrective of what is a current, past, and present harm to a large number of women philosophers; and (b) the alternative mechanisms suggested still require individuals or small groups of individuals to make assessments and decisions ("Should we publish this paper? Perhaps not") that are subject to implicit biases and are likely to continue to result in the exclusion of women-authored papers. Quotas, if implemented, would correct for this problem.

#4—The most obvious objection to quotas is similar to one that arises in discussions of affirmative action more broadly: namely, the quality objection. If it is required that 28–34 percent of papers in *Ethics* and *JMP* are written by women, wouldn't this require *Ethics* and *JMP* to publish papers that wouldn't normally meet their high standards? Wouldn't a quota diminish the quality of the work being published in these journals? The answer is no.

Women often author papers of high quality. This is evidenced in the women-authored papers that are published in *Ethics* and *JMP*. However, because of implicit bias, it is likely that high-quality papers by women (and other minorities) were previously submitted to these journals but were unjustifiably excluded. Subtle markers of femininity may influence reviewers' perceptions of the papers that they review and may lead to negative evaluation of women's work. Furthermore, when anonymity is compromised, reviewers will know the gender of the author. In these cases, implicit bias may lead to negative evaluations of work that is known to be authored by a woman. A quota might give us the pause we need, as reviewers, to ensure that these papers are not excluded any longer.

Furthermore, introducing quotas would improve the overall quality of a journal. When the author's identity is known, implicit bias leads to a tendency not only

to negative assessments of women's work but also to overly positive assessments of men's work. By ensuring that women-authored papers are published, quotas would correct for this overly positive assessment of men's work by ensuring that equally good or better papers by women are included in elite journals.

#5—One might argue that quotas are not a good option because they are very likely to reinforce the structures that lead to the gender problem in philosophy in the first place. Women are likely to be alienated from the profession largely because of the stereotype that women lack the ability and skill to do good philosophy. A quota system in elite journals is likely to reinforce this stereotype. A quota system would suggest that women are in need of help because they cannot meet the high standards of publication in elite journals on their own. This, in turn, would suggest that women lack the necessary skills and abilities to do good work in philosophy. This would stigmatize women in the field by contributing to the negative perception of women in philosophy and would likely further alienate women from the discipline. (Notice that this objection applies in relation to other methods of improving women's representation in journals as well.)

This objection runs parallel to discussions about affirmative action more generally. Many people argue against affirmative action in the workplace for the reasons mentioned—namely, that it may be stigmatizing. In the end, this may not turn out to be the case. Research on the contact hypothesis shows that once white individuals are in contact with black individuals, for example, in the workplace, white individuals start to perceive black individuals differently and more positively. In fact, white individuals start to see black individuals as non-black.[36] It may be the case that if we come into indirect contact with women through women-authored papers, women would be viewed in similar ways. There is some reason to think that indirect contact of the type discussed here may have positive effects on the perception of women in philosophy. Indirect or "extended contact" can have similar effects to direct contact. For example, the mere knowledge that an in-group member has a friend in an out-group may be sufficient to reduce bias among other in-group members.[37] Perhaps publishing women-authored pieces could have a similar effect. Once individuals come to know that women are publishing in elite journals and, in turn, that they are part of the elite in-group of philosophers, bias against women in philosophy may be reduced.

Furthermore, as Elizabeth Anderson has recently argued, affirmative action need not be stigmatizing. The targets of affirmative action

> can function as agents of integration and destigmatization. They are not passive recipients of compensation delivered to them as victims, but partners with the practitioners of affirmative action in breaking down barriers that block segregated groups' access to mainstream opportunities.[38]

Women authors will benefit from quotas. However, this need not be stigmatizing. These women can be viewed and view themselves as working toward improving

the representation of women in elite ethics journals and alleviating the broader gender problems in philosophy. Furthermore, education of philosophers, both women and men, regarding the prevalence of implicit biases, its negative effects on women, and the corrective function of quotas (both in terms of improving quality and correcting for implicit bias) could also work to destigmatize the recipients of quotas.[39]

#6—There is a further worry related to stigmatization. If we implement a quota that would ensure that elite journals contain more papers by women, then these journals may no longer be considered of high standing. In becoming more open to women-authored papers, these journals may themselves become stigmatized, being viewed as "women's journals" and, in turn, being viewed as being of low quality. If this is the case, then quotas would not work to improve the perception of women and their philosophical abilities. Quotas would only further the very problem they were implemented to solve.

To prevent this problem, one option might be to stop short of proportional representation just at the point that a journal might be perceived as being a "women's journal." For example, if at 30 percent, *Ethics* and *JMP* are perceived as being "women's journals," then perhaps we should stop at 28 percent—or at whatever percentage falls just below the point at which a journal becomes perceived in this way.

Admittedly, stopping short of proportional representation because of the possibility of the journal becoming coded as a "women's journal" in order to maintain prestige is far from ideal. It would likely mean that fewer papers than would be proportional to the number of women in ethics are published in elite ethics journals. As a result, less progress would be made toward ensuring that women are no longer underrepresented in elite journals and toward eliminating the gender problem in philosophy.

The best solution may be to undermine the association between maleness and good quality. If we could challenge this association, it would likely work to eliminate much of the implicit bias that has kept women-authored papers out of elite journals. It might also work to eliminate the stereotype threat that leads women to undervalue their work and to prevent them from submitting papers to elite journals. In turn, this solution might be more likely to result in proportional representation of women authors in elite journals.

First, it is important to note that we could and should work on reducing the connection between maleness and good quality as we simultaneously implement quotas. There is nothing preventing us from doing both. Second, I doubt that we can undermine the association between maleness and good quality. The connection between maleness and good quality is deep and pervasive, and it is present not only in philosophy but in the broader culture. It is far from clear that this association can be diminished in either or both spheres. While undermining the connection between maleness and good quality may constitute the best solution to

the underrepresentation of women in elite journals, it seems unattainable. While it is far from ideal, quotas may be the better path forward. There may be no *best* solution to the problem of the underrepresentation of women in elite journals or to the broader gender problem in philosophy. There may just be better solutions—solutions that lead to at least some progress. It may be that the gender problem in philosophy and underrepresentation of women in elite ethics journals are such significant problems that we need to put aside the ideal—a search for which often leaves us unable to make any attempt to solve the problems that face us—and start considering what might work, even if only slightly, to improve the situation. Quotas may be better than what is currently being done (even though not the best solution) to ensure better representation of women in elite journals.

#7—If the arguments for gender-based quotas hold because of women's underrepresentation in elite journals, then they should also hold for other minority groups as well. After all, many groups other than women are underrepresented in elite journals—such as black, Asian, and Hispanic groups. It follows that there is also a case for proportional representation of these groups in elite journals. However, there will likely be a conflict between various groups' claims to representation. For example, implementation of gender-based quotas might work to advance white women while being to the detriment of black men and, potentially, black women. In this case, gender-based quotas might lead to the underrepresentation of black philosophers in elite ethics journals. One might argue that it is almost impossible in cases like this to adjudicate between claims for proportional representation between women and black individuals. Furthermore, one might argue that gender-based quotas actually make the situation worse for other groups, and that "doing something" is in fact worse than "doing nothing at all." This is the problem with one-dimensional programs such as quotas: they fail to consider the downstream effects on other dimensions that are not under their purview.

These are difficult problems to address. In part, some of the negative effects of gender-based quotas on other groups could be alleviated by the implementation of quotas for other relevant groups such as black, Hispanic, and Asian. Furthermore, it is important to note that quotas are not a panacea for discrimination and bias. Quotas can work to ensure the inclusion of work by at least some individuals from underrepresented groups, even if not all. It is better to ensure proportional representation for obvious cases of exclusion than none at all. Furthermore, it is likely that many other solutions outside and alongside of quotas are necessary not only to ensure proportional representation of other groups but for women too.

#8—One might argue that the main problem that leads to the underrepresentation of women and other minorities is structural. It has to do with the structure of the discipline and the way that journals work. First, the stakes regarding publishing in elite journals are very high. Since publishing in elite journals helps to ensure strong tenure files and the possibility of promotions to better positions, everyone is fighting to publish in these journals. Second, journals publish a very

limited number of papers per issue. *Ethics* publishes seven papers per issue, and *JMP* publishes four papers per issue. Because of (1) the fierce competition and (2) the limited space for publication, there is a scarcity of resources. As a result, it will be literally impossible to ensure that all minorities are featured in a journal proportionate to their presence within the discipline.

There are a few ways around these problems. One way would be to somehow lower the "stakes" by severing the link between tenure/promotion and publication in elite journals. It is unclear how this would be accomplished. Much like the biases that link men with good quality, the bias in favor of prestige seems deep and broad. Even if it were possible to lower the stakes in this way, the value of this approach would be questionable. Competition for publication in elite journals is an important part of the discipline. It is how we measure the quality of the work that we do and, in turn, it may serve as an appropriate basis for tenure and promotion. One other option may be to reduce the scarcity of space in elite journals by increasing the number of articles that are published in each of their issues. As we move toward online publication, this becomes more feasible, since there is greater space available. In turn, there should be more space that can be filled by relevant minorities such as women. Finally, even if we do not increase the number of papers published per issue, implementing a quota will ensure at least greater representation of some of those who are underrepresented. This is better than what is currently the case. Again, the fact that it is not a complete or even a relatively ideal solution does not mean that it isn't the best option currently available.

5. Conclusion

The underrepresentation of women in elite journals and the broader gender issue in philosophy are problems that are not easily solved, since they are prevalent and persistent. While I have not given a full defense of quotas as a solution to the underrepresentation of women in elite journals, I have tried to show that they cannot easily be dismissed. The number of women in philosophy is only decreasing as women become more and more alienated from the discipline. It is time to consider whether a full defense of quotas can be given and, if so, how we can start implementing them in elite ethics journals.

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NOTES

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1. Haslanger, "Women in Philosophy?"

2. Paxton, Figdor, and Tiberius, "Quantifying the Gender Gap," 949–57.

3. Ibid., 952.

4. In "Women in Philosophy?," Haslanger writes the following: "The best data we have suggests that in 2011, the tenured/tenure-track faculty in the 51 graduate programs ranked by the Leiter Report—the most widely used status ranking of anglophone philosophy departments—included only 21. 9 percent women." On a related note, see also Schwitzgebel and Jennings ("Women in Philosophy," 83), which notes that the percentage of women faculty in philosophy are similar outside of the United States: "Women are estimated to make up only 23 percent of the philosophy faculty in Australia" and "24 percent in the UK."

5. Paxton, Figdor, and Tiberius, "Quantifying the Gender Gap."

6. Ibid., 955, quoting Walker, "Diotima's Ghost," 156.

7. Norlock, "Gender Ratios of Papers."

8. Liao, "Updates from the Journal of Moral Philosophy." Reconfirmed through correspondence with Matthew Liao (current editor) in 2015.

9. This data is from 2011–2014. See the American Philosophical Association, "Journal Surveys: Ethics."

10. Brooks, "View from the *Journal of Moral Philosophy*," 16.

11. Henry S. Richardson, "Triply Anonymous Review Process," 19. He reports that 2007–2008 women-authored papers were at 17 percent, and in 2008–2009 were at 15 percent.

12. Schwitzgebel and Jennings, "Women in Philosophy."

13. Ibid., 9.

14. Haslanger, "Preliminary Report," 11.

15. Schwitzgebel, "Citation of Women."

16. Jennings, "Gourmet Ranking and Gender."

17. Schwitzgebel and Jennings, "Women in Philosophy." The data focuses on the fifty departments that Leiter ranked in his 2014 Gourmet Report (https://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/default.asp).

18. A similar argument is made regarding the causes of the gender problem in philosophy more generally, by Saul ("Implicit Bias").

19. Here, I draw on Saul ("Implicit Bias") and Jost et al. ("Existence of Implicit Bias," 42–43).

20. Moss-Racusin et al., "Science Faculty's Subtle Gender Biases." For a summary of these findings and why they matter, see Yurkiewicz ("Study Shows Gender Bias").

21. Snyder, "Abrasiveness Trap."

22. Brooks, "View from the *Journal of Moral Philosophy*," 16. Interestingly enough, if we look at the early years of *JMP*, we don't see such differences between submission rate and publication rate. For example, in its first year, 38 percent of its submissions were by women and 40 percent of its published papers were by women. In 2009, only 20 percent of submissions were by women, and only 15 percent of its published papers were by women. It seems that as *JMP* became more established, it came closer to *Ethics* in terms of its submission and publication rates.

23. Richardson, "Triply Anonymous Review Process at Ethics," 19–20.

24. This definition is derived from Steele and Aronson ("Stereotype Threat"). Steele and Aronson were the first to coin the term "stereotype threat."

25. Spencer, et al., "Stereotype Threat." More recent evidence suggests that stereotype threat appears in other analytic fields. In "Women in Science and Engineering," Lawal suggests that "women have low self-ratings of their ability in analytical fields that have traditionally been male-dominated" (7). Lawal's work suggests that women students of science and engineering suffer from stereotype threat as well.

26. Saul, "Implicit Bias," 41.

27. Brooks, "View from the *Journal of Moral Philosophy*," 16.

28. Richardson, "Triply Anonymous Review Process at Ethics," 19–20.

29. Saul, "Implicit Bias."

30. Saul makes a similar point in "Implicit Bias."

31. For examples of arguments against affirmative action that focus on reverse discrimination, see Newton ("Reverse Discrimination"); Black ("Erosion of Legal Principles"); Capaldi (*Out of Order*, 535–36).

32. For examples of arguments that focus on desert, see Eastland and Bennett (*Counting by Race*, 144); Simon ("Individual Rights," 96); and Gross (*Discrimination in Reverse*, 125–42).

33. For examples of arguments in favor of affirmative action, see Beauchamp ("In Defense of Affirmative Action," 143–58); Sterba ("Michigan Cases," 1–12). Some of the objections that I consider may raise or at least point to discussion that relates to the question of whether affirmative action itself is justifiable, but this is not the focus of my discussion.

34. Saul seems to be in support of peer review. In "Implicit Bias," she writes: "Anonymous review is apparently only rarely practiced in ecology and evolution journals. But one such journal, *Behavioural Ecology*, recently decided to do it. They found that it led to a 33% increase in representation of female authors" (41). I am more skeptical of peer review than she is, for the reasons discussed below.

35. Correll, Benard, and Paik, "Getting a Job," 1297–338.

36. For discussion of the "contact hypothesis" and other closely related issues, see Anderson (*Imperative of Integration*, chap. 6, especially p. 145, which discusses the "contact hypothesis," and chap. 7, especially p. 147 and p. 150, which discuss affirmative action without stigmatization).

37. This effect was first noted in Wright, McLaughlin-Volpe, and Ropp ("Extended Contact Effect," 73–90). Further discussion can be found in Turner et al. ("Test of the Extended Intergroup Contact Hypothesis," 848–60).

38. Anderson, *Imperative of Integration*, 150.

39. This suggests that it is essential that quotas are complemented with a robust education program within philosophy about the mechanism and cause of implicit bias and with strategies to combat it.

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